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Abstract
The effect of time pressure on metacognitive control is of theoretical and empirical rel-
evance and is likely to allow us to tap into developmental differences in performances 
which do not become apparent otherwise, as previous studies suggest. In the present study, 
we investigated the effect of time pressure on metacognitive control in three age groups 
(10-year-olds, 14-year-olds, and adults, n = 183). Using an established study time alloca-
tion paradigm, participants had to study two different sets of picture pairs, in an untimed 
and a timed condition. The results showed that metacognitive self-regulation of study time 
(monitor-based study time allocation) differed between age groups when studying under 
time pressure. Even though metacognitive control is firmly coupled at 10 years of age, the 
overall level of self-regulation of adults was higher than that of children and adolescents 
across both study time conditions. This suggests that adults might have been more sensi-
tive to experiential metacognitive cues such as JoL for the control of study time. Moreover, 
the timed condition was found to be more effective than the untimed, with regard to study 
time allocation. Also, there was an age effect, with adults being more efficient than 10- and 
14-year-olds.
Keywords Metacognitive control · Time pressure · Study time allocation · Development · 
Efficiency
Most of the time we find ourselves in  situations of time pressure when acquiring new 
knowledge. This is not only the case in our professional lives but is particularly true for 
children and adolescents in educational settings. Such time pressure might affect our meta-
cognitively guided decisions, which involve the monitoring and control of our own cog-
nitive processes (Flavell, 1971; Walczyk & Griffith-Ross, 2006). In learning situations, 
people might monitor how they are progressing and, based on this self-assessment, decide 
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whether to continue investing time and effort into studying, but equally important, whether 
to stop doing so. Yet, little is known on how time pressure affects these metacognitive deci-
sions. Moreover, from a developmental point of view, time pressure might have dissimilar 
effects on different age groups, given that the mechanisms underlying metacognitive pro-
cesses show substantial changes across childhood and adolescence (Garner & Alexander, 
1989; Paulus et  al. 2014; Schneider, 2008). Knowledge about how time pressure affects 
metacognitive control in children and adolescents would thus be highly valuable for both 
evidence-based approaches in education and instruction as well as theories on the develop-
ment and nature of metacognition.
Nelson and Narens (1990) outlined a theoretical framework of procedural metacogni-
tion, which proposes that during task performance metacognitive monitoring processes 
inform subsequent control. This model highlights the importance of accurate monitoring as 
a prerequisite for adequate control and, not surprisingly, considerable research with adults, 
but also children, has investigated the basis of metacognitive monitoring and the conditions 
that influence its accuracy (Hertzog et al., 2003; Koriat, 1997; Metcalfe & Finn, 2008; Sch-
neider, 2010a; Townsend & Heit, 2011). Moreover, an increasing amount of developmen-
tal studies has explored the second major component of procedural metacognition, namely 
that of metacognitive control and how children come to use the outcome of their metacog-
nitive monitoring processes to guide their study choices (e.g., Bernard et al., 2015; Destan 
et al., 2014; Koriat et al., 2014; Metcalfe & Finn, 2013; Roebers et al., 2014; Son, 2005; 
Tsalas et al., 2015).
Metacognitive control, time pressure, and difficulty
One line of research on metacognitive control, which has crucially shaped our understand-
ing of the developmental pathway of these abilities, has focused on the amount of study 
time learners allocate to learning material of varying difficulty. In a typical study time allo-
cation paradigm, participants are presented with easy and difficult learning material, for 
example picture- or word-pairs, and can study these in an untimed manner. On the one 
hand, developmental research on study time allocation has focused on the extent to which 
learners allocate their study time to objective item difficulty (a priori defined easy and dif-
ficult learning material); on the other hand, it has explored the extent to which learners 
allocate their study time in line with subjective monitoring judgments about item difficulty 
of the material they have to learn, in other words, subjective judgements of learning.
One of the first developmental footprints of metacognitive control that has been 
observed, is that at the age of 6 to 7  years children learn to differentiate in their study 
time allocation between material of objectively varying difficulty (e.g., Destan et al., 2014; 
Dufresne & Kobasigawa, 1989). Additionally, and for the purpose of the current study 
more relevant, research which has specifically looked at the extent to which learners allo-
cate their study time in line with their subjective monitoring judgments has shown that the 
relation between these subjective judgments and the allocated study time becomes stronger 
across the elementary school years (e.g., Lockl & Schneider, 2003). At around 10 years of 
age, children, like adults, engage in self-regulated learning, defined as the extent to which 
learners allocate their study time in line with their own subjective monitoring judgments 
(e.g., Lockl & Schneider, 2003; Metcalfe & Finn, 2013).
An important aspect that has so far been neglected in research on metacognition dur-
ing studying is the effect of time pressure on metacognitive control, despite its ecological 
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and theoretical relevance. First, as noted at the outset, both children and adults often find 
themselves in situations of time pressure when studying new material. A better understand-
ing of the effect of time pressure on metacognitive control during learning might therefore 
give us an important insight into children’s abilities to cope with such situations. Second, 
time pressure has been shown to create a hot cognitive situation that affects human behav-
iour in various domains, such as decision-making and risk taking (e.g., Edland & Svenson, 
1993; Maule & Svenson, 1993; Ordonez & Benson, 1997; Suter & Hertwig, 2011) but also 
learning (e.g., Ackerman & Lauterman, 2012; Walczyk & Griffith-Ross, 2006). Moreo-
ver, empirical evidence has indicated that children, who perform equally well as adults in 
cold situations – cognitively less demanding and/or less stressful, nevertheless show devel-
opmental differences in hot cognitive situations – cognitively more demanding or stress-
ful (e.g., Luna & Sweeney, 2004). Therefore, developmental differences in metacognitive 
control might become apparent in more demanding learning situations, such as learning 
under time pressure or learning difficult items and would lead to a more comprehensive 
understanding of the nature and development of metacognitive control. Comparing meta-
cognitive control between untimed and timed conditions could therefore complement our 
understanding of the development and refinement of the interplay between monitoring and 
control skills across childhood and adolescence.
In summary, considering the demanding cognitive situation that time pressure might 
create during learning, learners might allocate their study times more efficiently under time 
pressure. There have been no systematic studies that have specifically looked at the effect 
of time pressure on subjective self-regulation of study time (monitoring based study time 
allocation), forming the focus of the current study. Our study adds and goes beyond to the 
models in the literature, and investigates of metacognitive control and timing, an issue, that 
has so far hardly been examined in a developmental context.
Deterioration and enhancement hypotheses
As indicated above, there are limited number of studies in the literature on study time 
allocation, and it is hard to predict the possible developmental effects of time pressure 
on metacognitive control with the existing literature. Nevertheless, based on the big-
ger metacognition literature, we can derive two hypotheses on the effect of time pressure 
on metacognitive control: the deterioration hypothesis and the enhancement hypothesis. 
The deterioration hypothesis is based on considerations that the awareness of time con-
straints might distract learners from the task at hand, thereby reducing important cognitive 
capacities, such as working memory resources (Dunlosky & Thiede, 2004; Kellogg et al., 
1999). There are indeed cognitive and neural processing similarities and relations between 
metacognitive monitoring and control, and executive functions (for reviews see Demetriou 
et al., 2018; Lyons & Zelazo, 2011; Roebers, 2017). Considering that monitoring and con-
trol only seem to become linked with age, time pressure might have a more negative effect 
on those populations whose monitoring and control processes are still more loosely tied 
together. In other words, it is possible that time pressure has a negative effect on metacog-
nitive self-regulation, but particularly in children. Indeed, it has been shown that develop-
mental differences become more apparent in hot cognitive situations on a variety of tasks, 
(Best et  al., 2009; Blakemore & Robbins, 2012; Figner, et  al., 2009; Luna & Sweeney, 
2004) lending reasons to assume that in a timed learning context, a similar pattern might 
be observed with respect to monitoring based control. That is, even though children might 
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show similar metacognitive self-regulation in untimed learning conditions as adults, their 
skills might not be refined enough to withhold a more overwhelming learning situation 
under time pressure. In contrast, the enhancement hypothesis suggests that slight time pres-
sure improves peoples’ performance, because they do not engage in “failing courses of 
action” (Henderson et al., 2007, p. 81) and instead might even engage in a “more strategic 
and situation sensitive manner” (Son, & Metcalfe, 2000, p.218).
Examining metacognitive control in timed and untimed learning situations is, beyond 
that, informative for the question when and how children and adults decide to stop learn-
ing. That is, when studying under untimed conditions for example, it would not be efficient 
to invest an endless amount of time into studying something, if no learning is taking place 
(cf. Metcalfe & Kornell, 2003; Murayama et  al., 2016). Continuing to invest study time 
without any learning return would be, as Nelson and Leonesio (1988) argued, labouring 
in vain. From a developmental point of view, people are likely to develop a better sense of 
their own learning progress and learning rate and thereby become more efficient in meta-
cognitive self-regulation with age (for a review, see Schneider, 2008, 2010b). This leads to 
the prediction that with age learners become increasingly skilled in assessing their rate of 
information uptake and in adjusting whether they will continue investing study time or not. 
However, considering that metacognitive abilities continue to improve especially in adoles-
cence years (e.g., Koriat et al., 2014; Van der Stel & Veenman, 2010; Weil et al., 2013; see 
also Schneider, 1998), it would be crucial to include an adolescence sample for more con-
clusive results. Importantly, time pressure might mediate the efficiency of the study time 
allocated into learning, because learners might rely on different rules when deciding to stop 
investing study time into learning items in untimed and in timed conditions. It would, for 
example, not be efficient to invest the spare time you have under time pressure into memo-
rizing something really difficult as compared to several easier items if the ultimate goal of 
learning is to have memorized as many items as possible. Therefore, in untimed study con-
ditions, learners might focus on the optimisation of their learning outcome. Indeed, whilst 
learning, they could be mentally rehearsing whether they have really memorised the learn-
ing item and in doing so, might end up investing more study time than needed and thereby 
might be labouring in vain. In the timed conditions on the other hand, learners might rather 
focus on reaching a satisficing1 level of learning (cf. Simon, 1955) and might in fact study 
in a more efficient manner. Consequently, imposing time constraints would lead learners to 
study more efficiently. From a developmental point of view, it would be interesting to see 
what the effect of time pressure on children’s and adolescence efficiency would be. Would 
they benefit from the time constraint as suggested by the enhancement hypothesis, or would 
it have a detrimental effect on their efficiency as proposed by the deterioration hypothesis?
This study
In this developmental study we were interested in the effect of time pressure on two aspects 
of metacognitive control: (1) self-regulation of study time, that is, the extent to which learn-
ers allocate their study time in line with their subjective monitoring judgments and, (2) the 
efficiency of study time allocation, that is the ratio of successfully recalled items and the mean 
1 Terminology adopted from Simon (1955). Satisficing is a combination of the words “satisfy”, and “suf-
fice”.
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time invested into learning these items. Note that the operationalization of the term self-regu-
lation is the allocation of study time guided by metacognitive monitoring. Thus, in the follow-
ing paragraphs, instead of “monitoring based study time allocation”, we used the term “self-
regulation” as suggested in the literature stated above.
In line with the enhancement hypothesis, learners might act in a more strategic manner 
and therefore engage in a higher level of self-regulation in timed conditions, whilst the 
deterioration hypothesis would predict that the level of self-regulation would be lower in 
the timed than in the untimed condition. Similarly, we wanted to see whether the efficiency 
rate would be affected by time pressure. In line with the enhancement hypothesis, and if 
learners try to reach a satisfactory level of learning rather than aiming to optimise their 
learning outcome, we expect a higher efficiency rate in the timed condition. From a devel-
opmental point of view, we were interested to see whether adults, who are more experi-
enced, benefit from time pressure and would act in a more self-regulated manner, whereas 
children aged 10, who perform well in untimed conditions (e.g., Dufresne & Kobasigawa, 
1989; see also Waters & Schneider, 2010), might show problems in timed conditions and 
therefore have a lower level of self-regulation in the timed than in the untimed condition. 
Similarly, with respect to efficiency, we were interested whether participants of all age 
groups might benefit from time pressure and act in a more efficient manner, or whether 
there would be differential effects between the age groups. Because this is the first study to 
investigate study time allocation in adolescents, we were also interested to see whether par-
ticipants generally become more self-regulated with age even in untimed conditions. Note 
that this is also the first systematic study investigating the relation between metacognitive 
control and time pressure in a developmental sample.
We adopted a standard allocation of study time paradigm (e.g., Lockl & Schneider, 
2003; Metcalfe & Finn, 2013) in which learners had to study picture pairs of varying dif-
ficulty. Learners studied a set of picture pairs in an untimed and a set of picture pairs in 
a timed condition. We captured participants monitoring through judgments of learning 
(JoLs), that is, participant’s predictive judgment about the likelihood of remembering what 
they recently learned in the future. As a measure of self-regulation, we calculated the rela-
tion between the study time and learners JoLs. Furthermore, as a measure of efficiency we 
divided the sum of correctly recalled items by the study time invested into these items (e.g. 
Ackerman & Lauterman, 2012).
Method
Participants
There were 183 participants in this study: 60 ten-year olds (M = 10.32  years, SD = 0.20; 
23 girls), 63 fourteen-year-olds (M = 14.41  years, SD = 0.14, 31 girls) and 60 adults 
(M = 25.52 years, SD = 6.77, 42 females). Eight participants did not provide their date of 
birth. However, the age group that they were belonged to were provided. Our sample size 
was based on the f effect sizes of two studies using similar paradigms (Dufresne & Kobasi-
gawa, 1989; Paulus et al., 2014). G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) sensitivity calculation from 
these two studies for the mixed ANOVA with 0.05 alpha value and 0.80 power with 0.50 
assumed correlation among repeated measure gave the effect sizes for the between subject 
factors 0.19 and 0.21, respectively. Calculations based on these effect sizes yielded a sam-
ple size of 162 and 192.
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All participants were native German speakers with heterogeneous socioeconomic back-
grounds. Children’s families were contacted via letter. Parents received a compensation for 
travel expenses and children received a small present at the end of the study. The group of 
adults were university students who participated for course credit. Informed consent was 
obtained from participants or from the primary caregivers who accompanied the children 
to the study. The institutional ethics committee approved the study.
Materials and design
The experiment used a 3 × 2 × 2 × 2 mixed design with three age groups (10-year olds, 
14-year olds and adults, between-subject), in two orders (untimed first or timed first, 
between subject), tested in two learning conditions (untimed and timed, within subject), 
and learning material at two levels of difficulty (easy and difficult, within subject). Some 
participants got the untimed learning block first (n = 89, 28 ten-year-olds, 31 fourteen-year-
olds, and 30 adults) and some others got the timed learning block first (n = 94, 32 ten-
year-olds, 32 fourteen-year-olds, and 30 adults). In the results section, the order effect was 
excluded, and the difficulty effect was excluded from the confirmatory analyses (see the 
data analyses section for further details).
The learning material consisted of 56 pictures, which were combined into 28 two-
dimensional picture pairs for the study phase: 14 easy ones, where the pictures had a strong 
association (e.g., king-throne, baker-cake) and 14 difficult ones, where the pictures had a 
weak association (e.g., nut-horn, salad-candle). In each timing condition (see procedure 
section) participants were presented with 14 picture pairs (7 easy and 7 difficult ones). Pic-
tures were selected from various internet resources. “Easy” and “difficult” classification 
were based on the categorical association between picture or word pairs following the rel-
evant literature in paired association tests (Dufresne & Kobasigawa, 1989; Tibon & Levy, 
2014; Tversky, 1973). We used easy and difficult items to prompt some variance in the JoL 
given by learners, which is necessary for the calculation of one of our main dependent vari-
ables (self-regulation). Similar to other studies (e.g. Lockl, 2013; Lockl & Schneider, 2003; 
Paulus et al., 2014), we used a 5-point smiley scale ranging from a frowning smiley on the 
left (indicating low likelihood of remembering), to a smiling smiley on the right (indicat-
ing high likelihood of remembering) to collect JoLs. Material was presented on a 15-inch 
MacBookPro using the software Psychopy (Peirce, 2009). A written transcript was used to 
note down participants’ answers in the recall phase.
Procedure
Participants sat at a table in front of a laptop and next to the experimenter. At the begin-
ning of the experiment, participants were told that they would have to learn picture pairs 
so that in a subsequent test they would be able to name the picture on the right side (tar-
get) when only presented with the left picture (cue). In order to familiarise participants 
with the pictures, the 56 single pictures were first presented, item-by-item, in the middle 
of the screen. Participants were asked to name the pictures in one word and were corrected 
in case they could not name the picture or gave an incorrect answer. The familiarisation 
was followed by two learning blocks, which were the two conditions participants were 
tested in: an untimed learning block in which they could study for an unlimited time, and 
a timed learning block in which they had ~ 29–30 s to study all the material for this block. 
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Because of the program used to present study items, there was a very slight difference 
between age groups in total presentation time in timed condition (10-year-olds, m = 29.08, 
SE = 0.05; 14-year-olds, m = 29.17, SE = 0.05; adults, m = 28.95, SE = 0.14), even though 
all the participants were tested with the same computer and in the same location. However, 
this difference was negligible, as the overall distribution and median of the total presenta-
tion time in timed condition among three age groups were not significant, independent-
samples median test, mdn = 29.02, χ2 = 0.10, p = 0.995. In each learning block participants 
were presented with 14 picture pairs (7 easy and 7 difficult ones) which were presented in 
random order in each of the phases of the learning blocks which will be described below. 
The untimed and the timed learning block both followed the same procedure and were 
separated by a 10-min interval in which participants engaged in unrelated activities. For 
different participants, these activities involved one of the following: participating in a short 
eye-tracking experiment (anticipating the actions of an agent in very simple setting), pilot 
studies on grasping behaviour (end-state-comfort effect), or watching a movie in case one 
of the first tasks were not given. Both tasks are cognitively very low-demanding for the age 
groups in this study, and participants generally demonstrate a ceiling effect in these tasks 
and perform them with great ease. We defined the stimulus presentation time for the first 
learning block (1.5 s for each item), and also for the second learning block in timed condi-
tion (overall ~ 29–30 s) based on a pilot testing. Note that these ranges are compatible with 
other studies using paired associate’s tasks (Tibon & Levy, 2014; Tversky, 1973).
Untimed learning condition
They were initially shown 14 pictures pairs (7 easy, 7 difficult) one after the other in a ran-
domised order, presented for 1.5 s each. Participants were instructed that they should try to 
memorise which pictures were presented together. After this initial fixed learning phase, 
a second phase followed in which participants were only presented with the left picture 
of the picture pairs they had just seen with a 5-point smiley scale appearing underneath 
the picture. For each item, they were asked to make a JoL, i.e. to indicate how sure they 
were that they would remember and could name the second picture in approximately 5 min 
time. After these JoLs, participants were told that they would now have time to re-study 
those picture pairs again at their own pace for an unlimited time. They were asked to try to 
study the picture pairs, so they would remember all or as many picture pairs as possible. 
As usual, the experimenter emphasised that a good performance would include them hav-
ing spent as little time as possible to study these pictures (e.g., Lockl & Schneider, 2004). 
In order to allow for a dynamic study experience, participants could move forward and 
backward in the list and were informed that if they arrived at the end of the list, it would 
automatically start from the beginning. During the presentation there was a progress-beam 
with 14 blue dots, one for each picture pair. The dot that corresponded to the picture pair 
currently seen on the screen was highlighted in orange. The progress beam served to allow 
participants to have an overview over the number of items in the list. The picture pairs were 
presented in random order. After the presentation, participants had to complete a one-min-
ute arithmetic exercise. They were then presented with the cue pictures (the left pictures) 
of all the picture pairs they had seen and were asked to name the target picture. The experi-
menter noted the answers down.
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Timed learning condition
The timed learning block followed the exact same procedure as the first learning block 
with 14 randomised pictures pairs (7 easy and 7 difficult) presented in an initial fixed pres-
entation phase followed by a JoL phase, a study phase, a short distractor task and the final 
recall phase. The only difference to the untimed learning block was that in the study phase 
participants had a limited time of 30 s to study all the picture pairs. A countdown on the 
top right corner of the screen starting at 30 s and counting down in full seconds indicated 
how much time they still had left to study.
Data analysis
Our study was both hypothesis-driven and data-driven. It was hypothesis-driven in a way 
that we always kept the main effects that we had specific hypotheses in our statistical mod-
els. It was data-driven in a way that we compared all possible models including the interac-
tion effects, and selected the best models based on model comparisons. Even though we 
did not have specific hypothesis on the effect of order (timed condition first or untimed 
condition first), and the difficulty effect, we kept these effect in the models as a control 
variable, whenever possible. We indicated the results with the order effect in the Supple-
mentary Material. The order effect and its interactions were deleted for the results section 
of the main paper for the sake of parsimony, and the results were written without the order 
effect and its interactions. Before testing our hypotheses on metacognitive control (self-
regulation and efficiency), we checked the effect of our manipulations on judgements of 
learning, recall (percent), and study time allocation (mean study time). We calculated five 
different models for these dependent variables, after the process described below.
As the assumptions for General Linear Models (in particular mixed ANOVA) were vio-
lated (normal distribution of dependent variable for each between subject group, homo-
geneity of error variances, homogeneity of inter-correlations, skewed distribution, or nor-
mal distribution of errors) in most of the cases, we used Generalized Linear Mixed Model 
(GLMM) (see Bolker et al., 2009; Stroup, 2013). Conducting GLM while these assump-
tions are violated (especially with complex designs) might lead Type-II errors, so that we 
adopted the GLMM approach. Note that GLMMs are very flexible and robust if the data 
represent non-normal distribution. Beyond that, they allow to add a random effect, such as 
controlling for individual differences as random intercepts (see Bolker et al., 2009; Stroup, 
2013).
If the assumption of normality violated (normal distribution of the data and the errors), 
for model selection, we first compared three type of error probability distributions (Gauss-
ian, Gamma, inverse Gaussian) with log link function (see Lo & Andrews, 2015), and also 
with different covariance types as the repeated measures data mostly violated homogene-
ity of inter-correlations assumption. We used robust estimator for the test for fixed effects 
as the homogeneity of variances assumption were violated in most the cases. The mod-
els included all main factors and their interactions as fixed effects, and random intercept 
based on subject number to control random intercept variability. In the error distribution 
selection phase, the best model was selected based on Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) 
score, regarding the fact that the number of fixed and random effects were the same in 
each model, but only the repeated covariance type and probability error distribution was 
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different (Raftery, 1995). However, having too many interaction terms may inflate models, 
and increase both Type-I and Type-II errors in both General Linear Models and GLMMs 
(Murtaugh, 2014; Weakliem, 2016). Following the recent discussions in the statistics lit-
erature, we used stepwise deletion of interaction terms, beginning from the most com-
plex interaction term, based on both alpha and Akaike’s Information Criterion corrected 
(AICC) values (Harrison et al., 2018; Weakliem, 2016). We started deletion from higher 
order interaction with the highest alpha value, while keeping all the main effects through 
different models. If the deletion decreased the AICC value, we kept the predictor inde-
pendent of its alpha value (Lindsey & Jones, 1998; Weakliem, 2016). In the last step, we 
also deleted the effect of order and its interactions. Please see Supplementary Material 1 
for the analysis including the order effect. All the post hoc comparisons were sequential 
Bonferroni corrected. In order to estimate effect sizes, we additionally calculated mixed 
ANOVAs (Gaussian distribution, identity link function, unstructured covariance matrix for 
repeated measures, model based covariances, and without random effects) as there is no 
agreed upon effect size measure for GLMMs, especially when the covariance structure of 
the repeated measures is changed from unstructured to other covariance types. Thus, there 
is no index of effect sizes for the respective tests in the results section (for GLMM models). 
We provided mixed ANOVA results with the partial eta-squared (ηp2) for the effect sizes 
(see supplementary material).
Descriptive statistics and the figures in the text are based on actual (non-transformed) 
values. However, statistical calculations were based on transformed data. In GLMMs, the 
link-function transformation is different than log-transforming (or any other transforma-
tion of) the dependent variable. Instead, in the GLMMs described below, the model link 
function transformation can be described as follows: “Transformed and original scales are 
connected by a monotonic differentiable link function that allows back-transformation to 
the original metric by providing a one-to-one mapping between the range of fitted values 
produced by the linear predictor on the transformed metric and the range of observed val-
ues on the original metric” (Lo & Andrews, 2015). For further information about GLMM 
with a linear predictor, please see Lo and Andrews (2015).
All the data was analysed, and the graphs were constructed with the statistical package 
SPSS-25 (IBM Corp., 2017). All the data, model comparisons, assumption checks, and 
analyses syntax can be found in the following Open Science Framework link: https:// doi. 
org/ 10. 17605/ OSF. IO/ UZBQK 
Results
As described above, before testing our hypotheses related to metacognitive control, namely 
whether participants allocated their study time based on their judgements of learning (self-
regulation) and efficiently allocate their study time (efficiency), we checked the effect of 
our manipulations on the JoLs, recall, and study time allocation as exploratory/preliminary 
analyses. Note that metacognitive control calculations were metric values based on these 
values. In this way, we also would be able to compare our preliminary results with the lit-
erature (please see Table 1 for descriptive results).
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Exploratory/preliminary analyses: judgments of learning, recall, and study time 
allocation
Judgments of learning
In order to analyse whether manipulation of item difficulty was successful, and easy and 
difficult items received different JoLs, we calculated a GLMM with JoLs as the dependent 
variable, age group (10-year olds, 14-year olds, adults) as between subject variable, and 
time condition (untimed and timed) and item difficulty (easy and difficult) as within subject 
variables. Based on the BIC scores, the GLMM with Gaussian distribution and log-link 
function, and compound symmetry repeated covariance type were selected. Besides four 
main effects, the best-fit model did not include any interaction term. Random intercept was 
not included in the model, as the model did not converge with the random intercept.
There was a significant main effect of age group, F(1, 727) = 8.468, p < 0.001. Ten year 
old’s JoLs were significantly lower than 14-year olds’ JoLs, t(727) = -4.218, p < 0.001, and 
adults’ JoLs, t(727) = -2.998, p = 0.006. There was also main effect of item difficulty, F(1, 
727) = 534.136, p < 0.001, with easy items receiving higher JoLs than difficult items. See 
Table 1 for the descriptive results. These results demonstrate that judgements of learning 
increase with age. Nevertheless, all age groups gave lower judgements of learning to diffi-
cult items, which indicates that our objective item difficulty was in line with the subjective 
evaluations of difficulty.
Recall
We calculated a GLMM with number of recalled items as the dependent variable, age 
group (10-year olds, 14-year olds, adults) as between subject variable, and time condition 
(untimed and timed) and item difficulty (easy and difficult) as within subjects variables. 
Based on the BIC scores, the GLMM with Gaussian distribution and log-link function, and 
diagonal repeated covariance type were selected.
There was a significant main effect of age group, F(1, 720) = 17.069, p < 0.001, with 
adults remembering significantly more items than 14-year olds, t(720) = 2.881, p = 0.008, 
and 10-year olds, t(720) = 5.293, p < 0.001. Moreover, 14-year olds recalled significantly 
more items than 10-year olds, t(720) = 2.121, p = 0.003. There was also a significant main 
effect of condition, F(1, 720) = 73.917, p < 0.001, with more items being recalled in the 
untimed condition than in the timed condition. The main effect of item difficulty was also 
significant, F(1, 720) = 152.745, p < 0.001, with easy items were recalled more than dif-
ficulty items.
The best-fit model also included four interaction term: (1) Age Group X Condition, 
(2) Age Group X Difficulty, (3) Time Pressure X Difficulty, and (4) Age Group X Time 
Pressure X Difficulty). There was a significant interaction between age group and condi-
tion, F(2, 720) = 3.399, p = 0.034. In timed condition, while adults’ had a higher recall rate 
than 10-year-olds, t(720) = 4.454, p < 0.001, and 14-year-olds, t(720) = 2.783, p = 0.011, 
respectively, the recall rate was not significantly different between 10- and 14-year-olds, 
p = 0.112. On the other side, in untimed condition, even though adults had higher return 
rate than 10-year-olds, t(720) = 3.860, p < 0.001, other pairwise comparisons were not sig-
nificantly different (all ps > 0.086). There was also a significant interaction between age 
group and difficulty, F(2, 720) = 15.479, p < 0.001. For the easy items, adults recalled 
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significantly more items than 10-year-olds, t(720) = 2.528, p = 0.035, but the other pair-
wise comparisons were not significant (all ps > 0.052). For the difficult items, adults 
recalled significantly more items than 10-year-olds, t(720) = 5.697, p < 0.001, and 14-year-
olds, t(720) = 3.239, p = 0.003, respectively, but the difference between 10-year-olds and 
14-year-olds was not significant, p = 0.053. There was a significant interaction between 
condition and difficulty, F(1, 720) = 43.386, p < 0.001, which mainly stem from the dra-
matic increase in the recall rates of difficult items in the untimed condition compared to 
timed condition, (26% increase), t(720) = 8.920, p < 0.001. For the easy items, there was 
also an increase (%7) in recall performance in untimed condition compared to timed condi-
tion as well, and the difference was also significant, t(720) = 5.625, p < 0.001.
Finally, there was also a significant three-way interaction between age group, condition 
and difficulty, F(2, 720) = 3.892, p = 0.021. To inspect this complex interaction, we split the 
condition and item difficulty, and compared age groups in each situation: timed easy, timed 
difficult, untimed easy, and untimed difficult. In the timed condition with the easy items, 
none of the comparisons between age groups were significant (all ps > 0.132). Again, in 
the timed condition, but with difficult items, adults recalled significantly more items than 
10-year-olds, t(720) = 4.994, p < 0.001, and 14-year-olds, t(720) = 3.242, p < 0.001, respec-
tively. The difference between 10-year-olds and 14-year-olds was not significant, p = 0.133. 
In the untimed condition with the easy items, none of the comparisons between age groups 
were significant (all ps > 0.143). In the untimed condition with the difficult items, adults 
had higher recall rates than 10-year-olds, t(720) = 3.956, p < 0.001, and the other pairwise 
comparisons were not significant (p > 0.112). See Fig.  1 and Table  1 for the descriptive 
results.
Not surprisingly, the overall recall rate increased from 10-year-olds to adults, and partic-
ipants recalled more items in untimed condition. The item difficulty results clearly showed 
that our difficulty manipulation, which was based on categorical similarity or difference 
between picture pairs, provides ‘objective’ difficulty in recall. Even in the timed condition, 
Fig. 1  Mean percentage of recalled items for the three age groups in the timed and untimed conditions and 
for easy and difficult items. Error bars represents the 95% CI 
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participants recalled more easy items than difficult items in all the age groups. Careful 
examination of the interaction effects reveal that results mostly based on the dramatic dif-
ference between adults and 10-year-olds in the most challenging condition: timed condition 
with the difficult items.
Study time allocation: mean study time
In order to investigate the average study time that participants in the three age groups allo-
cated to easy and difficult items, we calculated a GLMM. Mean study time was calculated 
by summing up the time spent on the easy or difficult items separately and then dividing 
these sums by the number of items that were studied (7 easy and 7 difficult). We conducted 
a GLMM with age group (10-year olds, 14-year olds, adults) as between a subject factor, 
and condition (timed or untimed) and difficulty (easy and difficult) as within subject fac-
tors, and the mean study time invested into studying as the dependent variable.
Based on the BIC scores, the GLMM with Gamma distribution and log-link function 
were selected. Diagonal repeated covariance type was used. The main effect of condition, 
F(1, 722) = 472.275, p < 0.001, and item difficulty, F(1, 722) = 321.829, p < 0.001, were 
significant, with more time invested into items in untimed condition than timed condition, 
and less time being allocated to easy items than difficulty items, respectively. Another main 
effect, age group, was not significant, p = 0.120. The best-fit model also included a two-way 
interaction between age group and difficulty, F(2, 722) = 8.654, p < 0.001, and condition 
and difficulty, F(2, 722) = 30.820, p < 0.001. Even though included in the best-fit model, 
the age group and condition interaction was not significant, F(2, 722) = 2.677, p = 0.069. 
To follow up the age group and difficulty interaction, we split up the age groups, and com-
pared item difficulties. Results demonstrated that with growing age, participants separated 
less time on easy items and more time on difficult items, all ps < 0.001. To follow-up the 
condition and difficulty interaction via splitting the condition and comparing two item diffi-
culties, results indicated that the time allocation difference between easy and difficult items 
was far higher in the untimed condition and lower in timed condition, all ps < 0.001. Please 
see Table 1 and Fig. 2 for the descriptive results.
The mean study time allocation was higher in the untimed condition, and for difficult 
items. Moreover, age had a positive effect on strategical time allocation, such that allocat-
ing more time on difficult items compared to easy items. On the other side, expectedly, 
time allocation difference between easy and difficult items was higher in untimed condi-
tion, in favour of difficult items. In summary, beyond giving additional support for the 
objectivity of our difficulty manipulation, these results indicated that adults – compared to 
10-year-olds – are better in allocating their study time between easy and difficult items in 
both timed and untimed conditions.
Confirmatory analyses: metacognitive control (self‑regulation and efficiency)
As our hypotheses were based on metacognitive control (self-regulation and efficiency), 
this section includes our confirmatory analyses. Note that for the main analysis with self-
regulation (based on gamma correlation values), we did not include the factor of item dif-
ficulty in the calculation. This was because, as mentioned above, easy and difficult items 
were introduced to generate variance in JoL which is a prerequisite for the calculation of 
a gamma correlation. Followingly, the factor difficulty was also excluded from the final 
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model on efficiency. However, please see the supplementary material for the efficiency 
analysis with difficulty.
Gamma correlations for self‑regulation
In order to explore whether participants allocated their study time in line with their meta-
cognitive monitoring, a gamma correlation between the JoLs and study time was calculated 
for each participant in both conditions (following Nelson, 1984) as a dependent variable. 
Gamma correlation coefficients between JoLs and study time are used (Koriat et al., 2006) 
as a self-regulation measure of metacognitive control in the literature (see Son & Metcalfe, 
2000).
Gamma correlations are based on the relative difference between concordant and dis-
cordant pairs for each participant between items. In our case, the pairs are consisted of 
JoLs and the corresponding study times for each item (14 items in total). To calculate 
gamma, the JoL values are sorted ascendingly. For each item, the JoL and the correspond-
ing study time value form the pairs. For each particular pair, when the study time value is 
higher compared to the study time value of the previous pair, then the pair is evaluated as 
concordant, and the other way around is discordant (for more information, see Koriat et al., 
2006; Nelson, 1984; Son & Metcalfe, 2000). In this calculation, while the positive values 
indicate low self-regulation, negative values indicate high self-regulation. Namely, while 
the positive values indicate that high JoLs are related to longer study time, meaning low 
self-regulation, negative values indicate that high JoLs are related to shorter study time, 
meaning high self-regulation. The values are depicted in Fig.  3. Note that there were 5 
missing cases (due to systematic selection of the same value in JoLs in a specific condition, 
Fig. 2  Mean study time allocated to easy and difficult items by each age group and in two timing condi-
tions. Error bars represents the 95% CI 
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correlation coefficients could not be computed). One sample t-tests showed that for all age 
groups and in both conditions, the gamma values were significantly different from zero 
(all ps ≤ 0.0005), thus from chance, with large effect sizes (Cohen’s ds > -1.014). As the 
normality assumptions were not violated, a GLMM with Gaussian distribution and iden-
tity-link function was used. We did not use a general linear model such as mixed-ANOVA 
as we created a random intercept model in the previous models too. Diagonal repeated 
covariance type was selected. The model included age group (10-year olds, 14-year olds, 
adults) as between subject variable, and time condition (untimed, timed) as the within sub-
ject variable.
Results yielded a main effect of age group, F(1, 357) = 16.253, p < 0.001, and condition 
F(1, 357) = 8.364, p = 0.004 (see Fig. 4). The best-fit model did not include the interaction 
effect between age group and condition. Gammas were stronger in the untimed condition 
compared to timed condition. Post-hoc tests showed 10-year-old had weaker performance 
in self-regulation than 14-year-olds, t(357) = 3.167, p = 0.003, and adults, t(357) = 5.701, 
p < 0.001, and 14-year olds had weaker performance in self-regulation than adults, 
t(357) = 2.418, p = 0.013. Please see Table 1 and Fig. 3 for the descriptive results.
Self-regulation – measured by the gamma correlations – results demonstrated that even 
though the ability to monitor the study time based on the judgements of learning is rela-
tively coupled by the age of 10 (as indicated by the significantly negative Gamma cor-
relations by t-tests against the zero-correlation value in each age group), self-regulation 
performance nevertheless increased with growing age. Moreover, participants were better 
in regulating their responses in untimed condition compared to the timed condition.
Fig. 3  Gamma correlations between JoLs and study time for the three age groups. Error bars represents the 
95% CI 
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Efficiency
As a measure of efficiency, we divided the sum of correctly recalled items by the mean 
study time invested into these items, following Ackerman and Lauterman (2012). In this 
way, we could see the rate of correctly recalled items per mean second. Thus, higher values 
of this rate indicate better efficiency. A GLMM with the rate of efficiency as the dependent 
variable, and with age group as a between subject factor, and condition (untimed, timed)as 
within subject variable were calculated. Following the confirmatory analysis with the self-
regulation, the effect of difficulty was also deleted from the final models (see Supplemen-
tary Material for the full analyses with the effect of difficulty). Based on the BIC scores, 
the GLMM with Gamma distribution and log-link function, and diagonal covariance type 
were selected. Four cases were not included in the model (0.5% of the data) as they were 
missing, which based on the zero-recall result of a 14-year-old child in a specific condition. 
Note that Gamma-log models do not accept zero and negative values.
There was a significant main effect of age group, F(2, 722) = 10.147, p < 0.001. Adults 
had significantly higher return rate than 10-year olds, t(722) = 4.055, p < 0.001, but not 
than 14-year olds, p = 0.120. However, 14-year olds had significantly higher return rate 
than 10-year olds, t(722) = 2.847, p = 0.009. There were also significant main effects of 
condition, F(1, 722) = 84.759, p < 0.001, with higher return rates in timed condition com-
pared to untimed condition. The best-fit model also included a nonsignificant interaction 
effect between age group and condition, F(2, 722) = 1.982, p = 0.139. Please see Table 1 
and Fig. 4 for the descriptive results.
Beyond self-regulation, efficiency results also indicated that metacognitive monitoring 
developed with the growing age. More crucially, return rates were higher under slight time 
pressure compared to under no time pressure.
Fig. 4  Efficiency of learning in untimed and timed conditions by three age groups. Error bars represents the 
95% CI
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Discussion
In the current developmental study, we investigated the effect of time pressure on metacog-
nitive self-regulation in study time allocation as well as on the efficiency with which learn-
ers allocated their study time. In order to reveal developmental differences, we assessed 
groups of 10-year olds, 14-year olds and adults using a standard study time allocation par-
adigm. Learners studied under time pressure or in an untimed condition. There are two 
major findings related to the aims of the study, and they will be discussed in the follow-
ing paragraphs. The first major finding of our study relates to metacognitively based self-
regulation of study time: The results showed that a) the level of self-regulation of adults 
was overall higher than that of children and adolescents, and, the self-regulation of 14-year 
olds was higher than that of 10-year olds, even though all the age groups’ have a relatively 
coupled self-regulation scores– as indicated by the results showing that the self-regula-
tion score of all the groups were significantly different from zero correlation value. More 
interestingly, b) the level of self-regulation was negatively affected by time pressure. The 
second major finding of our study showed that, in line with the enhancement hypothesis, 
under time pressure, participants from all ages studied in a more efficient manner than 
in the untimed condition and moreover, in the timed condition adults studied even more 
efficiently than 10- and 14- year olds. Nevertheless, there was no interaction between age 
group and timing condition in efficiency, suggesting that time pressure affect efficiency in 
all age groups in a similar way.
We interpret our findings as evidence for the following conclusions: First, our findings 
indicate that even though self-regulation is indeed an established strategy in 10-year olds 
(considering that all age groups performed better than zero correlation values on self-regu-
lation), there still appears to be a developmental lag (based on age comparisons) since the 
overall performance in self-regulation was higher in older age groups, which is in line with 
the previous studies (see Paulus et al., 2014). This result might be explained in the extent 
to which learners rely on experiential based cues for the control of study (for a review see 
Schneider, 2008). Second, our findings on higher efficiency of learning in the timed condi-
tion. This result might highlight the fact that different stopping rules might have been at 
play in the untimed and in the timed learning condition (see Ackerman, 2014) and it can be 
claimed that the use of a heuristic based stopping rule under time pressure increases with 
age (Koriat et  al., 2009a, b). Overall, the results of our study suggest that there are still 
important developmental differences in metacognitive-based control between age groups. 




First major finding of our study relates to participants’ self-regulation (based on gamma 
correlations) component of metacognitive control, which was negatively affected by time 
pressure. We found that gamma correlation was stronger in untimed condition. In line with 
the deterioration hypothesis, under time pressure, participant’s self-regulation was weaker 
compared to the no time pressure condition. Results also demonstrated that there was a 
significant effect of age group. Ten-year-old children, whose monitoring-control processes 
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are still not well-coupled compared to older age groups (e.g., Koriat et al, 2014), have more 
difficulty in self-regulation compared to other age groups, even though 10-year-olds are 
still able to regulate their responses at some degree. Comparable to the findings from the 
literature on objective item difficulty, it seems that allocating more study time to items 
perceived to be less likely to be remembered is an established approach by 14 years, and 
can be employed even in more challenging learning situations, i.e. under time pressure. 
Adults overall had a stronger gamma correlation in the current study, suggesting that they 
allocated their study time even more in line with their subjective monitoring judgments 
than children and adolescents. Thus, our findings thereby extend prevailing views in the 
developmental literature by showing that, even though at 10-years of age children differen-
tiate well in the study time allocated to items they perceive to be easily or more difficult to 
learn (Waters & Schneider, 2010), the interplay between monitoring and control processes 
continues to be refined across adolescence.
From a developmental perspective this finding leads to an interesting speculation on the 
factors that might influence the development of monitoring-based control. We can think of 
two mechanisms that might be at the root of this developmental effect, one of which relates 
mainly to monitoring processes and one which relates mainly to the ability to translate 
the outcome of ones monitoring into adequate control. There are two crucial premises to 
the first explanation. First, the cue utilisation hypothesis suggests that there are different 
kinds of cues on which learners base their JoLs (Koriat, 1997). Intrinsic cues give rise to 
theory based judgments about item-relatedness for example, whereas mnemonic cues, such 
as ease of learning or the ease of retrieval, are data driven and give rise to an experien-
tial feeling of the difficulty of a task (Koriat, 1997; Proust, 2013). Second, developmental 
empirical studies have shown that already 6–7-year old children rely on internal cues (item 
relatedness) in their JoLs, however that the reliance on mnemonic cues (ease of learning or 
retrieval) is a later developmental achievement (e.g., Koriat et al., 2009b; Koriat & Shitzer-
Reichert, 2002). Taken together, in the current study, it could be argued that two types 
of cues could have informed participants’ JoLs: internal cues (item-relatedness) and mne-
monic cues (effort needed to study each item). Both types of cues would have led to a dis-
tinction between easy and difficult learning items in monitoring judgments (and also study 
time), albeit through slightly different processes: internal cues through theoretical inference 
that highly related items are easier to remember than difficult ones, and mnemonic cues 
signalling that more effort is required for difficult than for easy items. However, compared 
to internal cues, mnemonic cues would have led to a more sensitive differentiation in JoLs 
and study time between items of normatively equal difficulty, for example between items 
within the set of difficult items. Therefore, one interpretation of the finding in the current 
study that adults overall engaged in higher self-regulation than children and adolescents, is 
that they relied on different, more item sensitive metacognitive cues for their metacognitive 
control.
We would also like to put forward a possible second explanation by referring to pre-
vious findings in the metacognitive literature, that the ability to translate ones monitor-
ing into adequate control processes seems to be a later developmental achievement (e.g. 
Dufresne & Kobasigawa, 1989; Lockl & Schneider, 2003). Note that previous findings 
have shown that already 9-year olds can use experiential cues as a basis for their monitor-
ing judgments (Koriat et al., 2009a). There is therefore no reason to assume that 10-year 
olds in the current study were not sensitive to such mnemonic cues. Instead, it could be that 
younger participants, like older ones, indeed relied on mnemonic cues in their monitor-
ing but failed to translate this into appropriate control. Indeed, this would coincide with a 
recent study by Paulus et al. (2014) which showed that only at 14-years of age did learners 
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apply the knowledge gained from first task experience in their predictions of others’ learn-
ing success. Extending this finding to participants’ own regulation of learning, the current 
study may suggest that using experiential cues for subsequent application of metacognitive 
control is a later developmental achievement.
Metacognitive control: efficiency
Time pressure
The findings of the current study – related to efficiency – add to the existing literature 
by showing that time pressure can lead to higher efficiency of metacognitively con-
trolled learning in adults but also in children and adolescents. In line with the enhance-
ment hypothesis, it might be claimed that (mild) time pressure prevented participants 
from engaging in unnecessary learning effort, resulting in higher efficiency. Indeed, in the 
untimed condition, despite being instructed to study for as little time as possible, partici-
pants invested much more study time than in the timed condition, which ultimately led to 
a less efficient outcome. We might therefore say that in the untimed condition, participants 
ended up labouring in vain (cf. Nelson & Leonesio, 1988). In other words, the recall rate 
per mean second was lower in untimed condition, which indicated that the additional time 
that participants pursued in untimed condition did not increase their efficiency rate.
As indicated above, participants from all age groups benefitted from the time constraints 
in sense of efficiency. We would like to put forward a possible explanation for this which 
relates to mechanisms investigated in the literature on heuristic based decision-making 
(e.g., Epstein, 1994; Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). Here, a 
distinction has been made between decisions that rely on heuristics, i.e. simple and quick 
"rules of thumb", as compared to controlled and more complex rational reasoning. Mark-
edly, it has been proposed that under time pressure people rather rely on quick heuristics 
when making their decisions (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999). The results of the current study 
open up the question whether similar mechanisms might be at play with respect to cue 
based metacognitive control in the timed condition. More specifically, in the untimed 
condition, participants might have been inclined to ensure the optimisation of their learn-
ing, thereby engaging in more elaborative monitoring and control of their progress, which 
resulted in the much higher amount of study time invested into learning overall (cf. Simon, 
1955; Winter, 2000). In the timed condition however, the stopping rule for learning each 
item might have been a different one, because there was simply not enough time to ensure 
that items had been optimally learned. Therefore, it might be, that under time pressure, 
participants relied on a heuristic stopping rule in their allocation of study time, which sig-
nalled that they have achieved a satisficing level of learning and should move on to the next 
item (cf. Simon, 1955).
Age and efficiency
Notably, in the timed condition adults were more efficient than both, 10- and 14-year olds, 
and 14-year olds in turn were more efficient than 10-year olds. This highlights that there 
are still developmental differences in metacognitive control between these age groups. If 
participants indeed applied a heuristic stopping rule for learning in the timed condition, 
then it is conceivable, that with age, learners were more sensitive to such cues, and that 
through experience, their heuristic responses were better calibrated. Such an interpretation 
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is in line with existing findings that point towards a developmental trend in the reliance on 
heuristics for decision-making (e.g., Davidson, 1995; Reyna & Ellis, 1994) and extends 
this theoretical approach to the study of metacognitive development.
Thus, it could be argued that our study is thereby the first to point towards the use of 
heuristic based decisions into the realm of metacognitive monitoring and control processes 
during learning, and moreover suggests that these are sensitive to developmental processes. 
Interestingly, even though there was no generally discernible developmental trend in the 
efficiency of learning between the age groups in the untimed condition, 14-year olds stud-
ied in a significantly more efficient manner than 10-year olds. In line with other recent stud-
ies (e.g., Koriat et al., 2014; Paulus et al., 2014; Weil et al. 2013) this pronounced effect in 
14-year olds highlights that adolescence might be an important transitional stage for the 
development of the metacognitive coupling between monitoring and control abilities.
Conclusion, limitations, and future directions
To briefly sum up, the current study investigated the effect of time pressure on metacog-
nitive self-regulation and efficiency of study time allocation during learning in children, 
adolescents and adults. It appears that during untimed study all participants engaged in 
more reflective metacognitive self-evaluations of their learning progress. Time pressure 
affected self-regulatory strategies in all three age groups, in a way that the overall level of 
self-regulation was significantly higher in adults compared to 10- and 14-year olds. There-
fore, the current findings highlight that, albeit somehow-established in 10-year olds, the 
interplay between metacognitive monitoring and control processes in the self-regulation 
of study time becomes increasingly sophisticated and continues to be refined across adult-
hood. With respect to the efficiency of learning, developmental differences between the age 
groups became more apparent especially in the timed condition, in that adults were even 
more efficient than 10- and even 14-year olds and 14-year olds studied in a more efficient 
manner than 10-year olds.
Even though we found an overall positive effect of slight time pressure on efficiency in 
all age groups, the other component of metacognitive control (self-regulation) was nega-
tively affected by slight time pressure. These results may have some implications for differ-
ent learning settings at school or work. We may speculate that children older than 14-year-
olds and adults may benefit from slight time pressure in learning some materials, especially 
easy ones, in sense of efficiency. However, on the other side, it should also be noted that 
especially 10-year-olds have difficulty in regulating their study time in line with their meta-
cognitive judgements – that is self-regulation.
On the other side, there are also some theoretical implications. While the results of the 
self-regulation were in line with the deterioration hypothesis, efficiency results supported 
the enhancement hypothesis. This particular theoretical implication may lead further stud-
ies on the subject. Even though these results are contradictory at the surface level, they 
might actually account for different levels of metacognitive control in study time alloca-
tion. To ascertain the optimality of a given time allocation strategy, Son and Sethi (2006) 
differentiate between (1) the relation between time allocation and competence, (2) and 
learner’s objectives in their metacognitive model for study time allocation. While the effi-
ciency measure might unfold the relation between time investment (study time) and com-
petence (e.g. recall), the self-regulation measure might unveil whether learners allocate 
their study time in line with their JoLs. Note that these two levels might have been affected 
The effect of time pressure on metacognitive control:…
1 3
from learning conditions in divergent ways. In the timed condition, participants may have 
not had ‘enough time’ to regulate their study time in line with their JoLs. However, the 
time constraint in learning might have paid of via reaching satisficing level of learning (cf. 
Simon, 1955), in other words, studying in a more efficient manner.
While our results clearly demonstrate the positive role of slight time pressure on meta-
cognitive control during learning – efficiency, there are some limitations that should be 
addressed in future studies. First, our study focuses on the metacognitive control during 
acquiring and recalling knowledge under time pressure or under no time pressure. How-
ever, results may differ in different types of tasks and in different time ranges of time pres-
sure. Thus, further research should investigate the effects of time pressure on different type 
of tasks and learning situations in greater detail. This is particularly relevant as time pres-
sure is present in many current learning contexts, such as schools or workplaces. Second, 
metacognitive control during time pressure might have been affected by differing time per-
ception in age groups. Temporal sensitivity, especially towards short time ranges, develops 
over the years (Droit-Volet, 2013; Zélanti & Droit-Volet, 2011). However, one should also 
note that metacognitive control and time perception may be co-developing abilities. More-
over, considering the hot cognitive situation that time pressure may create, children’s meta-
cognitive control performance could have been affected from their developing emotional 
regulation system. Future studies should investigate the possible developmental relations 
between metacognitive control, time perception, and emotion regulation. That is being 
said, 30-s time limit might have been far more challenging for the 10-year olds compared 
to adolescents and adults. It is possible that the difference between 10-year-old’s difficulty 
in metacognitive performance compared to other groups may have been due to the lim-
ited time window in the timed condition. Nevertheless, considering the exploratory results, 
there was no age group difference in study time allocation, but on JoL, recall, and metacog-
nitive control results. Thus, it could be claimed that not the speed of acting on the item but 
the further cognitive and metacognitive processing of information may have affected the 
performance. Future studies should also consider the effect of differing time windows on 
metacognitive control to further clarify the results and our claims.
Third, while interpreting our results for JoLs and self-regulation, we referred to the 
internal cues and mnemonic cues during metacognitive processes. However, future studies 
should investigate how exactly cues are used in different age groups. This may be done via 
owing an item-based study design and manipulating the type of cues used in the stimuli. 
Similarly, it should be also noted that the difficulty of an item is dependent on the difficulty 
of other items. Participants may apply different metacognitive strategies based on the level 
of relative difficulty of different items, rather than merely making “easy” and “difficult” 
distinction as we classified. Again, an item-based approach considering the ordinal diffi-
culty level of each item or a more comprehensive study including comparisons based on 
various item difficulty levels (e.g., easy-mild, easy-difficult, mild-difficult) might help at 
this point. Finally, the relatively-loosely coupled relation between metacognitive monitor-
ing and control processes in 10-year-old children may be explained by the mediating role 
of the working memory (Touron et  al., 2010), and the hot cognitive situation that time 
pressure might have created on children’s working memory. Extensive future research is 
needed to understand the casual relations between metacognitive monitoring/control, 
executive function (and working memory), and emotion regulation in hot cognitive situ-
ations. Considering that our adult group were university students (a selective group), who 
probably have better executive functions and emotion regulation compared to their peers, 
future research should also include wider groups of adults. Taken together, the current 
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study explored metacognitive control in timed and untimed learning conditions and points 
to developmental changes in metacognitive control.
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